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The Heroic Corporation and First Amendment 





“[T]here is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about, 
and that is not being talked about.”1 
 
 When I saw that Martin Redish
2
 and Burt Neuborne
3
 had written reviews 
of my book, Brandishing the First Amendment,
4
 for the Texas Law Review I 
was both pleased and apprehensive. The apprehension is easy to understand. 
As Professor Larry Kramer has observed, “Having one’s work closely 
criticized is never pleasant: hugely complimentary, and oh-so-much better 
than having it ignored, but still difficult and painful.”5 Thus, I approached 
both reviews with some trepidation. On the one hand, it was a compliment to 
be reviewed in such a prominent journal.  On the other, I had little reason to 
 
* Phyllis Hurley Frey Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.  Thanks go to 
Garrett Epps, Sam Halabi, Sandy Levinson, Steve Shiffrin, Bob Spoo and Gerald Torres for their 
feedback and suggestions. Many thanks to Nicholas Bruno and the other editors of the Texas Law 
Review for their excellent edits and their patience. This response is dedicated to the memory of one 
of the most eminent First Amendment scholars of our time, the late C. Edwin Baker. 
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 10 (Start Publ’g 1993). 
2. Martin H. Redish & Peter B. Siegal, Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the 
Fashionable Art of Corporation Bashing, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1447 (2013). 
3. Burt Neuborne, Taking Hearers Seriously, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1425 (2013). 
4. TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN 
AMERICA (2012). 
5. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 387 (2003). 
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expect that a review from Redish would be anything but critical.
6
 I hoped for 
something rather more positive from Neuborne.  I was disappointed. 
The reviewers and I obviously disagree on many points.  If there were 
no more to it than that, I would be content to agree to disagree.  However, 
since I think each review mischaracterizes or misunderstands one or more of 
the arguments in my book, or raises some issues which require a response, I 
want to offer some corrections and clarifications.  I thank the Texas Law 
Review for giving me the opportunity to do so, as well as to preview my 




I.  First Amendment Romance 
Although the two reviews offer different criticisms of Brandishing the 
First Amendment, they share a perspective grounded in the romantic tradition 
of First Amendment absolutism.
8
  For Redish and Siegal, that romanticism is 
reflected in a perhaps unwarranted faith that corporate and commercial 
speech
9
 is invariably valuable to listeners (we know it is valuable to 
speakers) and that corporate speakers are important “catalysts in the process 
of self-realization” for the citizenry at large.10  To support this proposition  
 
6. The book received some fairly good reviews, but none of them were in law reviews. See, e.g., 
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Book Review: Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial Expression in 
America, by Tamara R. Piety, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 737 (2012). The reviews on 
Amazon are particularly gratifying since one was written by Steve Shiffrin, a prominent First 
Amendment scholar. Steve Shiffrin, Consumer Review on BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/Brandishing-First-
Amendment-Commercial-Expression/dp/0472117920. For an example of a more critical review 
which is nevertheless fair see Mark A. Graber, Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial 
Expression in America, by Tamara R. Piety, 2 AM. POL. THOUGHT 163 (2013). 
7. Tamara R. Piety, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial Speech (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  
8.  See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245.  For one of the most well-known expressions of this tradition, see ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM 
FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007).  For a 
critique see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 21 (1971) (“Any such reading is, of course, impossible.”).  For a discussion of the romantic 
tradition generally, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND 
ROMANCE (1990).  And for a skeptical review of the First Amendment’s history, see DAVID M. 
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1–9 (1997) (arguing that the traditional story 
about the trajectory of the First Amendment obscures the often hostile reception early free speech 
claims received and noting that some famous, landmark cases actually upheld restrictions, even as 
the opinions proposed more expansive protection in theory). 
9. Commercial and corporate speech are generally viewed as doctrinally distinct. And 
technically they are. But in the book I argue that the corporate speech line of cases owes much to 
the earlier decision to protect commercial speech and that the feedback loop between the two means 
that the corporate speech cases, in particular Citizens United, have an impact on the commercial 
speech doctrine. For these reasons I group them together in this response. The differences are 
discussed at length in the book. See Piety, supra note 4, at 17–51. 
10. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1463 (emphasis in original). Given recent history, I think 
it requires a rather Panglossian view of the benefits of corporate and commercial speech to conclude 
that  robust First Amendment rights for commercial enterprises is in the public interest.  In another 




they rely on that hoary old First Amendment chestnut, “the marketplace of 
ideas.”11 In this view, more protection for speech is always better for 
freedom. And if some speech is abusive, oppressive, intrusive or annoying, 
the remedy is still more speech, not regulation. Thus, Redish and Siegal 
applaud the Supreme Court’s embrace of more protection for corporate and 
commercial speech because they see it as leading to an expansion of freedom 
of speech generally. 
Professor Neuborne, on the other hand, is less sanguine about the 
benefits to the public of corporate political speech.  He would restrict this 
sort of speech. Yet he apparently does not see any connection between 
protection for commercial speech (which he supports)  and protection for 
corporate political speech (which he does not).  I argue they are connected 
and that there is feedback dynamic between these concepts which, judging 
from recent decisions, may raise the danger of a First Amendment defense to 
commercial fraud or even to ordinary labeling, disclosure and truth-in-
advertising regulations.   
Moreover, Professor Neuborne reads into my critique of commercial 
speech and my argument that it should not receive robust First Amendment 
protection, evidence of the left’s abandonment  of one of its core principles.  
“[A]n expansive First Amendment was the darling of the American left,”12 he 
writes.  Now, he claims, many on the left are prepared to challenge “the very 
notion that regulating speech is particularly antithetical to a free society.”13  
He reads Brandishing the First Amendment as such a challenge.  I do not 
intend it to be. Rather, I argue in the book that commercial and corporate 
speech are not “speech” in the First Amendment sense (or, at this point, 
 
work, Redish has more modestly suggested that the public and private interests may merely 
intersect rather than completely overlap.  Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good 
for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
235, 235–36 (1998). 
11. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1453.  The metaphor is typically used, as it is in Redish 
and Siegal’s review, to suggest that more speech is invariably better and is more likely to lead to the 
production of the best ideas.  For a definitive refutation of that idea see Alvin I. Goldman & James 
C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 11–12 (1996) (proving 
that the market-maximizes-truth-possession hypothesis is demonstrably false); see also Robert Post, 
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2360 
(2000) (critiquing the tendency to take the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor too literally). 
12. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1425.   
13. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1432–33 & n. 34. For instance, he claims that some on the left 
have rejected the notion of “free speech as a trumping value that overrides almost all good faith, 
plausible efforts at government regulation.”  Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1432 & n.34, citing Reza R. 
Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 913, 915 (2007) and Sylvia 
A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 912 (1992).  I don’t think 
either of these articles really support this characterization. These authors are carving out exceptions.  
For better examples of work questioning some version of First Amendment absolutism more 
generally, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play 
in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic 
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983). 
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ought not to be, since the Court has extended some protection to them) and 
therefore the absence of First Amendment protection for these categories 
does little or nothing to undermine a free society. To the contrary, I argue 
that it is offering robust First Amendment protection to these categories of 
speech that ultimately undermines a free society.  
Finally, Neuborne also believes that my discussion of manipulation 
techniques and the psychology of professional persuasion is evidence that I 
do not give listeners enough credit and that I would support broadly 
paternalistic interventions because I think consumers are weak
14
  He 
misunderstands my argument.  It is precisely because I do credit listeners  
with autonomy that I argue they ought to be able to decide for themselves 
which advertising messages they want to receive, and that they ought to have 
the power to block advertising they do not wish to receive without triggering 
any countervailing speaker interest in speaking which would otherwise forbid 
them to exercise their autonomy in that way. 
II. Redish and Siegal: The Heroic Corporate Speaker 
 The Redish and Siegal book review is only partially a review of 
Brandishing the First Amendment.  A substantial portion of it is devoted to 
jousting with Professor Neuborne,
15
 and about a third of the review promotes 
the authors’ own  substantive project, which they describe as an attempt “to 
fashion a coherent explanatory theory of constitutional adjudication in order 
to understand this widespread systemic choice in favor of extending the over-
whelming number of constitutional rights and protections to corporations.”16 
To this end, Redish and Siegal present a picture of the corporation as 
hero—a Hohfeldian17 plaintiff litigating on our collective behalf.18  They 
argue that corporations “do and should possess First Amendment rights. . . . 
because of the vital instrumental role which the corporation serves in 
advancing the fundamental goals served by the First Amendment right of free 
expression through the process of private litigation.”19  Corporations, they 
 
14. Id. at 1439. 
15. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458–63 (most of this section discusses the authors’ 
disagreements with Neuborne). 
16. Id. at 1450. 
17. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE. L.J. 16 (1913). 
18. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1467–72. 
19. Id. at 1450 (emphasis added).  Apparently, only corporate litigants serve this important role 
of advancing our common goals through private litigation as  Redish is not terribly enthusiastic 
about class actions which  serve a similar function. He does acknowledge that “[o]ne of us has 
argued” that class actions “undermine[] democratic legitimacy.” Id at 1466 n.93 (citing Martin H. 
Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private 
Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 73); see also Martin H. Redish & Clifford 
W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 753 (2007).  In contrast, 
Judge Richard Posner has suggested class actions have proven more effective than the FTC in 
protecting consumer interests (although he believes the FTC nevertheless plays an important role in 
consumer protection).  Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 




argue, act as “economically incentivized” private-attorneys-general to 
vindicate First Amendment rights for us all.
20
  I am skeptical of this 
proposition.  Indeed, my skepticism about whether freedom for corporate and 
commercial speech advances fundamental First Amendment goals is one of 
the principal themes of Brandishing the First Amendment. 
Redish and Siegal offer many criticisms of my book, but a major one is 
that it is simply “corporation bashing.”21  But to illustrate this claim they  
offer up strawmen.  For example, Redish and Siegal imply that I would 
challenge a corporation’s right to bring a lawsuit, declaring that “[o]ur 
economy would no doubt quickly degenerate into a state of chaos if 
corporations were denied the opportunity to vindicate their legal rights in 
court.”22 This observation would be more germane if in the book I were 
challenging this right.  I do not.
23
  What I do dispute is whether commercial 
and corporate speech ought to enjoy full First Amendment protection, a 
proposition which is not so well settled as Redish and Siegal would like it to 
be. 
They also resort to some rather intemperate, or at least ungenerous, 
characterizations. Despite being on opposite sides of the commercial speech 
debate,
24
 I could have hoped for a more collegial tone.  Instead, Redish and 
 
ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 769–80 (2005).  So, it is not clear why litigation by corporations as private-
attorneys-general, benefits the public while class actions by consumers do not.  From a democratic-
legitimacy standpoint, class actions are arguably on firmer ground since the plaintiffs may also be 
voters, while corporations are not. 
20. Corporate litigants themselves have shown somewhat less enthusiasm for the private-
attorney-general device, at least in the hands of consumers. See Brief for the Ass’n of National 
Adver., Inc., et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–4, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 
654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835112 (objecting to the private-attorney-general provision of 
the California Unfair Competition and False Advertising laws involved).  In 2004 Nike and its amici 
got by ballot initiative what they could not get from the courts. The law was amended to remove the 
private-attorney-general provision after a ballot initiative (Proposition 64), campaigned for heavily 
by business on the grounds that it permitted fraudulent and extortionate law suits against small 
businesses.  Companies such as Philip Morris, Exxon, and State Farm combined to collectively 
contribute millions of dollars to the Proposition 64 campaign. See Jacquetta Lannan, Note, Saving 
17200: An Analysis of Proposition 64, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 451, 469 (2006).  Nike itself 
contributed $50,000. Id.  Ten years on, it is not clear that Proposition 64 has deterred fraudulent 
claims, but Lannan argues it has had a deleterious impact on consumer protection.  Id. at 475–76.  
21. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1457.  As I observe in the book, much of the criticism of 
corporate speech and of the influence of corporations on society has come from corporate 
governance scholars or authors whose long careers in business suggest that their criticism cannot so 
easily be dismissed as a product of “left-wing, corporation bashing.” PIETY, supra note 4, at 146 & 
n.27. 
22. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1449. 
23. Moreover, with respect to the right to sue, we do not need to engage in parsing of the 
meaning of the word “person” (or “citizen”) in general because there is a specific statutory grant of 
rights in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012), which provides that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a 
citizen” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction in federal court. 
24. Although I fundamentally disagree with him, I give Redish full credit for having been the 
principal architect of the commercial speech doctrine. See Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of 
Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21 & n.109 (2012).  Its 
subsequent expansion owes a great deal to Redish’s advocacy, both as a scholar and as an advocate.  
186 Texas Law Review See Also          [Vol. 92:181 
 
 
Siegal appear to “dismiss any disagreement as a product of bad faith or 
intellectual weakness.”25  I am accused of engaging in “fashionable”26 
corporation bashing, motivated by some unspecified “sociopolitical,”27 
“reflex[ive]”28 opposition.29  They use inflammatory characterizations, 






  But, 
perhaps most disappointingly, Redish and Siegal charge me with “a complete 
lack of familiarity” with constitutional law and a failure to grasp “the broader 
lens of constitutional theory,”33 as if my observations are outside the bounds 
of acceptable constitutional discourse. Given that some of the most 
distinguished constitutional scholars in the nation
34
 have made arguments 
similar to mine, this charge seems unfair.   
Apart from the overheated rhetoric, Redish and Siegal’s substantive 
critiques appear as follows: (1) that for-profit corporations must, as a logical 
matter, enjoy full First Amendment rights because corporations have been 
 
Indeed, he has continued to push for an expansive read of the First Amendment past the point many 
might deem advisable.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy 
as Free Expression, 76 ALB. L. REV. 697 (2012—2013) (criminal conspiracy). 
25. Kramer, supra note 5, at 387. 
26. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1457.  This allusion is in both the title of the review and in 
the text. Id. (“In constitutional academic circles, corporation bashing has in recent years become a 
very fashionable activity.”) (emphasis added). I would note that I have been writing on this topic in 
much the same way long before it was “fashionable.”  
27. Id. at 1464. 
28. Id. at 1472. 
29. Id. (“There appears to exist a post-Citizens United reflex among the uninformed and the 
ideologically driven to assume that because corporations are not humans, they are—both legally and 
metaphysically—incapable of asserting any constitutional right, much less the First Amendment 
right of free expression.”) (first and second emphases added; third emphasis in original).  This is a 
technique Redish has employed before. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First 
Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
67 (2007) (generally accusing opponents of being motivated by anti-capitalist ideology and 
“intuition”); Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech 
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553 (1997) (same). 
30. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1467. 
31. Id. at 1459 (“outrage”). 
32. Id. at 1464 (“detests”); id. at 1458 (“contempt”). 
33. Id. at 1448–49. 
34. For example, the scholars criticizing Citizens United include: Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., 
Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/22/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky22-2010jan22 (“[T]here is not the 
slightest shred of evidence that the framers of the 1st Amendment meant to protect the rights of 
corporations to spend money in election campaigns.”); David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and 
Corporations Aren’t People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_isnt_speech_and_corporations_arent_people.html (con- 
tending that expansion of some constitutional rights to corporations does not necessarily include 
speech rights); and Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, 
SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 24, 2010, 10:30 PM),  http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-should-
congress-do-about-citizens-united/ (arguing that corporations are using other people’s money when 
they engage in political speech, those people have not necessarily authorized the speech, and there 
are important differences between for-profits and not-for-profits in this context). 




granted other constitutional rights;
35
 (2) that my principal argument against 
robust protection for commercial and corporate speech is that a corporation 
lacks a “soul” and that this is an inappropriate criterion;36 (3) that regulation 
of corporate and commercial speech, which I support, represents “viewpoint” 
discrimination and that my support for regulation emanates from hostility to 
capitalism or free enterprise;
37
 and (4) that my failure to articulate a theory 
for why media companies can be distinguished from other for-profit 
corporations dooms my thesis.  I address each of these in turn.
38
 
A. Logical Coherence 
 Redish and Siegal portray the extension of First Amendment rights to 
corporations as speakers with distinct dignitary rights qua speakers as so 
obvious, so well-settled, that only someone without a good “grasp” of the 
broader sweep of constitutional law could be unaware of its existence and 
sagacity.  This is simply not true.  As they later admit, this issue is not quite 
so well-settled, or at least as explicitly articulated, as they wish it were.
39
  
Nevertheless, they press the logical coherence argument: “[I]f no doubt exists 
that corporations have standing to vindicate subconstitutional rights and 
protections, how, purely as a logical matter, could they be categorically 
denied the opportunity to invoke the nation’s highest law, the United States 
Constitution?”40 
 What Redish and Siegal mean by “subconstitutional” is a bit ambiguous, 
but if they mean to refer to rights created by statute, it is clear that the 
creation of a statutory privilege does not necessarily convey constitutional 
rights as well.
41
 Nevertheless, the authors imply that the extension of some 
constitutional rights to corporations must necessarily include the extension of 
all of them, except where it would be “incoherent”42 to do so, without saying 
why this is not one of those places where it would be incoherent.  Instead, 
they resort to a sort of ipse dixit: “[I]t is far too late in the day to let the mere 
fact of their corporate form categorically disqualify them from constitutional 
protection.”43 “Most of the battles over the constitutional status of 
 
35. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1457. 
36. Id. at 1458–59. 
37. Id. at 1463–65. 
38. Id. at 1460–61. 
39. Id. at 1452 n.25.  This footnote essentially admits that their argument has not been explicitly 
adopted by the Supreme Court. 
40. Id. at 1449 (second emphasis added). 
41. If it did, then it would seem that the declaration that a corporation is a “citizen” for purposes 
of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) would mean that corporations are citizens for purposes of 
the interpretation of the word “citizen” everywhere in the Constitution. That is not the case, as 
Redish and Siegal reluctantly admit.. 
42. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1449. 
43. Id.  
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corporations,” they write, “were long ago resolved in favor of allowing 
corporations to invoke constitutional guarantees.”44   
 The key word here is “most.”  Redish and Siegal know that it is not only 
“conceivable”45 that a corporation might enjoy some constitutional rights 
without enjoying all of them; it is the law.
46
  The issue is whether it is 
coherent to extend full First Amendment protection to corporations and to 
commercial speech.  Brandishing the First Amendment is a book-length 
argument that it is not. Redish and Siegal offer little by way of refutation of 
the evidence I discuss. 
B. The Corporation Has No “Soul” 
 Redish and Siegal’s second claim is that my opposition to robust 
protection for commercial and corporate speech grows out of the observation 
that  a corporation has no “soul.”  Although I use the famous observation that 
corporations have “‘no body to kick or soul to be damned,’”47 I am not nearly 
so concerned with the metaphysics of the corporate soul as I am with whether 
protection of commercial or corporate speech is as beneficial to listeners as 
its proponents claim, or whether protecting it promotes the values that the 
First Amendment is commonly assumed to protect. 
 To be sure, one of the reasons for my argument that protection for this 
speech does not advance these interests is that the corporation is just a legal 
fiction—a tool—not a moral actor in its own right.  That is not my only or 
most important claim, but I should note that this argument has a respectable, 
and, I might add, conservative, pedigree.  As former Chief Justice Rehnquist 
put it: 
Although the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s 
right of commercial speech,
48
 such a right might be considered 
necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation. It 
cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is 
equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation 
organized for commercial purposes.  A State grants to a business 
 
44. Id. at 1448. 
45. Id. at 1449. 
46. They offer the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as “the exception that 
proves the rule,” id. at 1457, as if this example stands in splendid isolation.  Yet they then go on to 
discuss at length another departure from this coherence model, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.  Redish and Siegal describe this line of cases as an “error” and exhort courts and 
commentators to eschew “anachronistically textualist stances” in interpreting the Clause. Id. at 
1452.  I am at a loss to know what an “anachronistically textualist” interpretation is, but it sounds 
suspiciously like they are urging the Court to reject the “plain meaning” or “original intent.” 
Perhaps the Court similarly strayed from the coherence model in denying a corporation a personal 
privacy exemption under The Freedom of Information Act. See FCC v. AT & T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
1177 (2011). 
47. PIETY, supra note 4, at 224. 
48. Note that this dissent indicates that, at least as of 1978, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not 
believe that Virginia Pharmacy had unmistakably conferred a First Amendment right on 
commercial speakers.  




corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited 
liability to enhance its efficiency as an economic entity.  It might 
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the 
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.  
Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of political expression 
are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for which States 
permit commercial corporations to exist.
49
 
If, as Justice Rehnquist suggested, expressive rights are not intrinsic to a for-
profit corporation’s organizing purpose, it is arguably “incoherent” to extend 
to it these expressive or dignitary rights.
50
  This is the opposite of Redish and 
Siegal’s argument. 
 Many distinguished scholars have argued that the corporation lacks 
status as a dignitary speaker.
51
  Indeed, this proposition is one locus of 
Redish and Siegal’s disagreement with Professor Neuborne.52  And they 
acknowledge that “scholarly criticism of the idea of corporate free speech 
rights is not entirely new.”53  Indeed it is not.  So the notion that this issue is 
well-settled or must be the product of some sort of political hostility seems 
like wishful thinking.  I am not sure what critical mass of contrary opinion is 
necessary before you can no longer claim that a viewpoint is completely out 
of bounds of respectable constitutional discourse as opposed to one you 
simply disagree with, but I think it has been reached here. 
 Redish and Siegal’s discussion of the corporate soul is simply an attempt 
to compress a number of my arguments.  In Brandishing the First 
Amendment, I argue that protection of corporate political speech owes a great 
deal to the earlier protection given to commercial speech,
54
 protection which 
 
49. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825–26 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added).  To be clear, in the above quote, Justice Rehnquist was playing devil’s advocate.  
He did not agree with the decision to extend First Amendment protection to commercial speech 
either. He also dissented in Virginia Pharmacy, observing that the decision “extends the protection 
of that [the First] Amendment to purely commercial endeavors which its most vigorous champions 
on this Court had thought to be beyond its pale.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  However valuable 
the free flow of commercial information may be, Rehnquist thought the Virginia law was simply a 
regulation of commerce and thus well within the powers of the state. Id. at 784 (“[T]here is certainly 
nothing in the United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the 
teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession.”).  
Rehnquist argued that the Virginia Pharmacy decision threatened to revive the discredited 
substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner era.  Id., citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726, 730 (1963).  
50. See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379 (2006). 
51. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458 n.50 (citing C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) and Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 
735, 739 (1995)); see also Bennigson, supra note 51; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: 
Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995 (1998). 
52. See, e.g., Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1461–63. 
53. Id. at 1458. 
54. PIETY, supra note 4, at 22-30. 
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was listener- not speaker-centric.  The subsequent development of a 
corporate political speech right dodged the hard question, which Justice 
Rehnquist alluded to in the quote above, of whether political speech was a 
necessary part of a for-profit corporation’s function.  Instead of answering 
that question, the Court (and many commentators) employed the listener-
centric justification for protecting this speech without sufficient attention to 
the question of whether the corporation as such, particularly the for-profit 
corporation, ought to be viewed as a speaker possessing distinct expressive, 
as opposed to economic, interests. 
 I argue that giving expressive rights to a legal fiction is a categorical 
mistake.
55
  My argument is not simply that a corporation is not a human 
being with expressive needs as a constitutive part of self (or, as Redish and 
Siegal would have it, that the corporation has “no soul”56), but that there are 
structural reasons to conclude that corporations “cannot be expected to 
produce truthful or reliable information when it is not in their economic 
interest to do so,”57 and that therefore, the assumption that robust First 
Amendment protection for corporate and commercial expression will benefit 
listeners or society generally is not well-founded.  Instead, such robust 
protection is likely to make it more difficult to regulate commercial 





 or otherwise provide consumers with information,
60
 
or by inhibiting the government’s ability to punish or restrain false, 
misleading, or otherwise injurious promotional speech and activities, whether 
through regulatory actions or through private lawsuits. I also argue that if we 
look at the practice of commercial and corporate speech, it does not appear 
that granting expansive First Amendment protection to what is, particularly 




55. Id. at 141–61. 
56. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458–59. 
57. PIETY, supra note 4, at 161. 
58. It is hard to keep up with the steady stream of First Amendment decisions on disclosures 
emanating from the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n. of Mfrs. v. SEC, No 13-5252, (D.C. Cir. 
Apr. 14, 2014) (holding SEC rule requiring disclosure of conflict minerals violates First 
Amendment); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking down an 
NLRB rule requiring employers to post information about the right to unionize). 
59. For example, the FDA’s graphic warning labels on cigarettes were struck down by the D.C. 
Circuit as compelled speech infringing on the tobacco companies’ First Amendment rights.  R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  Interestingly, another court found 
that another aspect of the new rules, that 50% of the package must be devoted to the warning, was 
constitutional under Central Hudson.  Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 
530–31 (6th Cir. 2012). 
60. After all, protecting consumers’ rights to receive truthful information was the rationale on 
which commercial speech received First Amendment protection in the first place.  See Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770–71 & n.24 (1976). 
61. To quote Judge Richard Posner, “[i]t seems paradoxical . . . to allow virtually unlimited 
regulation of the product . . . but to impose a constitutional obstacle . . . to the regulation of the sales 
materials for it.” Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. 




advances the interests the First Amendment is meant to protect.  Indeed, such 
protection may actually undermine those goals. Robust protection for 
commercial speech appears to offer what Professor Tom McGarity has called 
protection for the “freedom to harm.”62 
 In Brandishing the First Amendment I use Thomas Emerson’s survey of 
the various theories for why a society might wish to protect freedom of 
expression
63
 to ask if robust protection for corporate and commercial speech 
appears to further any of these values.  The four values in Emerson’s 
framework are: (1) autonomy and self-fulfillment; (2) contribution to 
knowledge (often invoked as the “marketplace of ideas”); (3) contribution to 
democratic self-government; and (4) contribution to social stability.
64
  
Drawing on evidence from work in a number of disciplines I conclude that, 
for the most part, protecting corporate and commercial speech does not 
further these goals.  Where such speech can be said to contribute some public 
benefit by, for example, offering consumers abundant choice with respect to 
some consumer good or a rich trove of material which can be used for 
consumers’ own expressive purposes,65 those benefits seem fairly modest 
compared to the rather more obvious types of harm which, if such speech 





 contribution to increased childhood obesity,
68
 and 
disproportionate corporate influence in the democratic process.
69
  The book’s 
 
REV. 1, 40 (1986).  Posner argues it is “sensible from an economic standpoint” to offer less 
constitutional protection to commercial advertising. Id. at 39. 
62. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE 
LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013) (discussing how limited regulation allows corporations to act in 
ways that harm the public). 
63. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Thomas I. 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) [hereinafter 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory].  Here I note that, contrary to Professor Neuborne’s assertion 
that Emerson fails to include the argument that the special dangers of government censorship 
warrant strong protection, see Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1437 n.54, Emerson actually spends a 
good deal of time, in a couple of sections of his article, discussing this issue, Emerson, Toward a 
General Theory, supra, at 887–96.  As I read him, Emerson does not include the checking value of 
the First Amendment in his catalog of positive values because he takes this aspect as a given, 
perhaps because of the First Amendment’s wording as a negative restraint on government.  For a 
discussion of how the courts’ application of this consideration has been uneven and how the 
checking value ought to receive more systematic and consistent consideration, see Vincent Blasi, 
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. 
64. Emerson, Toward a General Theory, supra note 64, at 878–79. 
65. See PIETY, supra note 4, at 80 (observing that commercial speech can offer consumers 
valuable information and may generally contribute to culture, but arguing the net effect is negative, 
for reasons explored in the rest of the book). 
66. Id. at 186–201 (discussing commercial and corporate speech’s contribution to economic 
instability and boom/bust cycles in financial markets). 
67. Id. at 202–22 (discussing commercial and corporate speech’s contribution to high levels of 
consumption, which generate a great deal of waste). 
68. Id. at 104–06 (noting its contribution to childhood obesity through marketing efforts to 
children). 
69. Id. at 165–85 (explaining its effects on the political process). 
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argument relies on a great deal more than the question of the corporation as a 
dignitary speaker, but Redish and Siegal ignore much of that material.   
C. Viewpoint Discrimination 
 Redish and Siegal’s third claim is that to make a distinction between 
corporations and human beings, or between commercial and non-commercial 
speech, is a form of viewpoint discrimination.
70
  And they claim I am 
motivated to engage in this viewpoint discrimination by my supposed 
hostility to corporations or to free enterprise.  But of course such “viewpoint 




 As to the charge of viewpoint discrimination itself (independent of 
motives), I submit that, by definition, the current commercial speech doctrine 
is not neutral; it singles out commercial speech for different treatment than 
other protected speech (at least in theory).  So the viewpoint discrimination 
claim does not work, at least with respect to commercial speech. More 
fundamentally, I argue that there is no viewpoint discrimination in regulating 
commercial (and corporate) speech because for-profit corporations do not 
engage in promoting “viewpoints”; they promote the sales of their products 
and services. 
 The entity itself is not alive and so doesn’t have opinions or viewpoints. 
And the human beings who work for a corporation are agents.
72
  If there 
happens to be a convergence between their personal views on, for instance, 
the desirability of drinking Pepsi, that may be a happy accident or the 
product of the psychological mechanism of motivated reasoning or cognitive 
dissonance.  But there is no necessary, or even likely, connection between the 
two.  When a salesman urges you to buy the vacuum cleaner he is selling he 
may believe it is truly the best for your needs, or he may secretly believe it is 
junk.  But the sales pitch he makes is not a “viewpoint” unless “I hope you 
buy my product” is a viewpoint.  It is an action intended to generate a sale.73 
And as an organization that is the whole of the organization’s viewpoint; it is 
some variation on, “Buy our product!” “Our company is responsible!” “Our 
company is a good investment!” 
Commercial speech is an artifact of commerce, and its regulation is 
necessary to effective regulation of commerce.  And although corporate 
 
70. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1463–65. 
71. For a discussion of pro-business decisions made by the Rehnquist Court, see generally 
Barbara K. Bucholtz, Destabilized Doctrine at the End of the Rehnquist Era and the Business 
Related Cases in its Final Term, 41 TULSA L. REV. 219 (2005) (discussing numerous pro-free-
enterprise decisions of the Rehnquist Court’s final term, as well as many other previous cases that 
held in favor of business interests). 
72. Professor Greenwood has made this argument particularly forcefully. See Greenwood, 
supra note 52, at 1061. 
73. If we were thinking about it in evidence terms we might call it a verbal act.  Verbal acts are 
statements that are not hearsay because of their character as legally significant actions that happen 
to take the form of words. 




political speech looks more “viewpoint-like,” I argue that appearances are 
deceiving because even corporate political speech is essentially driven by the 
same imperative, profit, not by the substantive issues. Much of what looks 
like political speech by corporations – such as issue related advertising or the 
discussion of labor practices – is really simply part of an integrated 
marketing communications strategy and thus, at least arguably, should be 
regulable on the same terms its other promotional speech is regulable.  The 
reason the two categories—corporate and commercial speech—are today 
doctrinally blurred is that the commercial speech doctrine, which located 
protection for commercial speech in listeners’ interests, contributed to the 
creation of the corporate-speech doctrine.
74
  Like in Virginia Pharmacy, in 
Bellotti the Court relied on listeners’ interests to justify protection for 
corporate political expression.
 75
 But the opinion  also raised the viewpoint 
discrimination argument,
 76
 despite not grappling, as Chief Justice Rehnquist 
so keenly observed, with the question of whether a corporation can even be 
said to have a “viewpoint,” let alone one that merited First Amendment 
protection. 
 In Bellotti the Court suggested that distinctions between corporate and 
other speakers were a sort of invidious discrimination.  Justice Powell 
writing for the majority observed: 
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that 
the State could silence their proposed speech.  It is the type of speech 
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less 




This sounds as if the Court is saying that the corporation’s speech is 
protected not because it is valuable to the listener, but because it is an 
intrinsic right of the speaker. Yet it did not expressly say the corporation’s 
speech was protected for its own sake. This viewpoint discrimination trope 
reflected in this much quoted passage  becomes quite problematic when it is 
applied to commercial speech. And although the commercial speech doctrine 
focuses on listener, not speaker interests this  viewpoint discrimination trope 
has migrated back to the commercial speech doctrine.
78
  Thus, advocates like 
 
74. The connections between the two are described at length in the book. See PIETY, supra note 
4 at 17–30.  
75. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
76. Id. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the 
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or 
individual.”) (emphasis added). 
77. Id. 
78. In at least one case a court has explicitly held that “business entities . . . are a species of 
associations of citizens entitled to constitutional protection as citizens” and that a law which applied 
only to certain businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause by “fencing out” “lawful businesses 
that are otherwise entitled to the same protections of law as other citizens.”  Noel v. Board of 
Election Commissioners, No. 1422-CC00249, slip op. at 15–16 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mo. Feb. 11, 2014).  
The measure in question was a ballot initiative which sought to bar the City of St. Louis from 
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Professor Redish argue that regulating commercial speech more heavily than 
other protected speech  constitutes viewpoint discrimination.  
 However, as Professor Neuborne has noted, the commercial speech 
doctrine did not include a notion of a dignitary speaker.
79
  Yet the viewpoint 
discrimination argument seems to assume such a dignitary speaker.  Without 
such a dignitary speaker, it is much more difficult to see why corporate or 
commercial speech must be protected because if protection for it rests solely 
on the benefit to listeners, then it should be unproblematic to deny protection 
where any benefit to listeners outweighs the harms such speech may entail.  
It strains credulity to suppose that everything for-profit corporations wish to 
say (and perhaps more to the point, much they do not want to say) is in the 
listeners’ interest to hear or that the public even wants to hear it.  Very often 




Of course, if there is a dignitary speaker, that changes the calculus.  
When the speaker himself has an expressive interest that the law respects the 
First Amendment provides that he must not be unreasonably censored and 
strict scrutiny applies.  Respect for the equal dignity of persons compels this 
result.  But there is no such theory of the equal dignity of legal fictions.  
Corporations are creatures of law.  It is perfectly appropriate to condition 
their privileges and powers by virtue of the terms governing their creation.  
Different types of corporations receive different tax treatment.  Companies 
organized to conduct specific types of business, such as banking or public 
utilities, are subject to different regulations than the producers of ordinary 
consumer goods.  There is nothing particularly sinister or discriminatory 
about such distinctions.  That does not change because the distinctions relate 
to speech. 
D. Media Corporations 
 Finally, Redish and Siegal claim my arguments are unconvincing 
because I do not distinguish between media corporations and other for-profit 
 
granting financial incentives to any “Unsustainable Energy Producer,” as defined in the proposal, as 
part of a Sustainable Energy Plan.  The judge granted a preliminary injunction against putting the 
proposal on the ballot because (among other things) he found “[t]he measure is quintessentially 
indistinguishable from the Colorado measure struck down in [Romer v.] Evans.” Id. at 16 (emphasis 
added) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (attempt to prelude legislature from passing 
laws which would forbid discrimination against homosexuals violated Equal Protection). 
79. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442 & n.80. 
80. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1151, 1152–53 
(“Consumers hate spam.  They hate pop-up ads, junk faxes, and telemarketing.  Pick any marketing 
method, and consumers probably say they hate it.  In extreme cases, unwanted marketing can cause 
consumers to experience ‘spam rage.’”).  Goldman argues consumers don’t always appreciate the 
value of marketing, and he makes an argument for robust protection for commercial speech despite 
this consumer dislike.  In my work-in-progress, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial 
Speech, I argue that it is this kind of argument that  is paternalistic and does not respect consumers’ 
autonomy.  Piety, supra note 7. 






  It is true that I do not discuss that distinction in the book, 
although I have discussed it elsewhere.
82
  As they know,
83
 however, this  
argument has been extensively articulated by others, in particular by 
Professor Ed Baker.
84
   So it is not as if there is no basis for concluding that 
such a distinction can be made. Since the treatment of the press clause would 
be the subject for another book, I never intended to provide a full answer to 
this question in Brandishing the First Amendment. (Even if I had, I am not 
sure Redish and Siegal would have liked my book any better.)  But given that 
I was writing the book for a general audience and that this question is bound 
to occur to even the casual reader, I did intend allude to it.  Somewhere in the 
many revisions the reference was apparently cut. I regret that omission. I will 
try to correct it very briefly here so it is clear why I do not think the objection 
about media corporations is fatal to my argument. 
 The press plays a distinctive role in checking government power and 
orthodoxy.
85
  This role justifies distinctive treatment of press corporations, 
despite their status as profit-making organizations.  Moreover, the existence 
of a separate press clause lends textual support to the proposition that media 
companies should be treated differently than other corporations.  According 
to the late Professor Baker, the special status of the press means that the press 




 It is true, however, that the Supreme Court has tended to collapse the 
free speech and the free press clauses;
87
 although, once again, this issue is 
perhaps not quite as well-settled as Redish and Siegal suggest.  And one 
problem with arguing that “the press is different” is that it is increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between the press and other businesses.  The 
interpenetration of marketing with editorial content is increasingly erasing 
what used to be the line between editorial and advertising content.
88
  And as 
 
81. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1460–61. 
82. Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367, 411 & n.248 (2006). 
83. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1458 n.50 (citing BAKER, supra note 51). 
84. Professor Baker makes this argument in several of his works, but the one that perhaps most 
clearly addresses the question is C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause 
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007); see also BAKER, supra note 51, at 229–49. A 
newer theory was recently offered by Professor Michael McConnell. Michael W. McConnell, 
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013). 
85. See supra note 84.  For an argument that the First Amendment more generally performs this 
function, see Blasi, supra note 64. 
86. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 84, at 956 (pointing out that the Supreme Court has provided a 
“different protection for the press and for individuals, with the press sometimes receiving special 
protections, but also with it sometimes being subject to regulations as structured enterprises that 
could not be applied to individuals”). 
87. See Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1451. 
88. A recent article in The New York Times Style Magazine discusses Ferragamo, the shoe 
brand, making several short films called “Walking Stories” to feature its shoes.  Alainna Lexie 
196 Texas Law Review See Also          [Vol. 92:181 
 
 
Redish and Siegal note, some non-media companies have attempted to 
become media companies.
89
  In general they haven’t been very successful,90 
maybe because people don’t find feature length ads terribly interesting.  
However, these sorts of attempts, along with phenomena like “native 
advertising”91 and other stealth-marketing techniques,92 illustrate the 
difficulty in making distinctions between media or press and other 
corporations. Redish and Siegal do not make as much of this as they could.  
However, the difficulty in distinguishing between editorial and promotional 
content and why this difficulty is troubling are topics I do deal with quite a 
bit in the book.
93
 
 That does not make the distinctions I propose to draw, between for-profit 
and not-for-profit corporations, or (by implication here) between press and 
non-press entities, any more fraught than many other legal line-drawing 
exercises, such as the distinction between public and private,
94
 or between 
 
Beddie, Rules of Style: Ferragamo’s New Leading Lady on Flying in Style and Dressing Like a 
Star, T: N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAG. (Oct. 8, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/201 
3/10/08/rules-of-style.  Interestingly, a critical turning point in this migration may have been when 
The New York Times opened up space on its editorial page for “advertorials.”  See, e.g., Clyde 
Brown & Herbert Waltzer, Every Thursday: Advertorials by Mobil Oil on the Op-Ed Page of The 
New York Times, 31 PUB. REL. REV. 197 (2005); Herbert Waltzer, Corporate Advocacy 
Advertising and Political Influence, 14 PUB. REL. REV. 41 (1988); see also ROBERT L. KERR, THE 
RIGHTS OF CORPORATE SPEECH: MOBIL OIL AND THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOICE OF BIG 
BUSINESS (2005). 
89. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1460–61. 
90. Budweiser launched a website called “Bud.TV” which was to provide nothing but native 
advertising.  See infra text accompanying note 91.  The site was only up for a couple of years.  
Chris Albrecht, R.I.P. Bud.tv, GIGAOM (Feb. 19, 2009, 7:55 AM), http://gigaom.com/2009/02/19/ 
rip-budtv. Also, recently, a feature-length film that included heavy product placement faltered rather 
spectacularly, in part because of the lack of a coordinated artistic vision or control free from the 
demands of the various brand managers involved.  Jake Rossen, Placing Products? Try Casting 
Them: The Rise and Fall of the Computer-Animated ‘Foodfight!’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/movies/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-computer-
animatedfoodfight.html.  The GEICO insurance “caveman” ads spawned a short-lived sitcom on 
ABC.  Stuart Elliott, Gauging Viewer Tastes: A New Dose of Escapism, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes 
.com/2007/05/16/business/media/16adco.html. The critical reception was poor and the viewer 
response dismal, and the show was pulled before all the episodes aired.  See Wikipedia, Cavemen 
(TV Series), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavemen_%28TV_series%29 (last modified Mar. 23, 
2014). 
91. Native advertising is editorial content created by an advertiser for promotional purposes.  It 
is a version of sponsored content which is far more elaborate than mere product placement.  For a 
discussion of the issue and how it works at the Huffington Post, see Paige Cooperstein, Native 
Advertising: How It Works at the Huffington Post, PBS, (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2013/10/native-advertising-how-it-works-at-the-huffington-post. 
92. PIETY, supra note 4, at 39–47; see also Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial 
Integrity, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 83 (2006). 
93. PIETY, supra note 4, at 39–45. 
94. Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and 
Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 78–79 (2010) (discussing the private/public 
dichotomy). 




expert and non-expert opinion testimony.
95
  And, unless we can make some 
of these distinctions, it seems that a good deal of the regulation of commerce 
will be under a constitutional cloud.  This is a key argument in my book 
which Redish and Siegal finesse with the observation that commercial speech 
is “a work in progress.”96 
 It was a similar observation that motivated me to write the book.  I too 
saw that the commercial speech doctrine was a doctrine in flux and that the 
trend of that “progress” was away from intermediate scrutiny and the 
justification on which the doctrine was based
97
 and toward this stealth 
version of a dignitary speaker and strict scrutiny.  I found this movement 
troubling because it seemed to have the potential to destabilize many existing 
regulatory regimes.  The movement toward strict scrutiny allows the 
commercial speech doctrine to be used as a weapon against regulation 
generally.  And the strong, anti-discrimination approach of the corporate 
speech cases adds weight to that observation. Hence the book’s title, 
“Brandishing the First Amendment.”  I predicted we would see more cases of 
the First Amendment being used as a weapon to challenge regulation. The 
record bears out this prediction.  
Since Citizens United there have been a flurry of cases raising First 
Amendment challenges to a variety of legislation.
98
  This turn of events may 
have troubling and unanticipated consequences; it may unsettle regulatory 
regimes which have been uncontroversial for decades.
99
  And as Redish and 
Siegal themselves note, “the government has not won a case challenging 
suppression of commercial speech in the Supreme Court in over twenty 
years.” Most recently, the Court has “at least implied that any regulatory 
 
95. See FED. R. EVID. 701–702 and advisory committee’s notes. 
96. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462. 
97. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–71 & n.24 
(1976) (noting that extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech did not prevent 
proper regulation or suggest that it was “wholly undifferentiable” from other types of protected 
speech). 
98. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but some of these cases are IMS Health, Inc. v. 
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (data mining statute violates First Amendment speech clause); R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down FDA’s graphic 
warning labels on cigarettes); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) 
(striking down law regulating sale of violent video games to minors); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs v. NLRB, 
717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (striking down NLRB rule declaring a failure to post a notice of 
employee rights an “unfair labor practice”); Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 
1357041 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to Ohio licensing requirement for 
dealers in precious metals); Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State, 166 Cal. Rptr3d 647 (Cal. 
App. Dist. 2014) (rejecting First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to law prohibiting the 
LSAC from “flagging” LSAT scores of applicants who have taken the exam with accommodations). 
99. PIETY, supra note 4, at 223; see also Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the 
Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 20–22 (2010), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/piety.pdf (offering a brief summary of the 
potential for unintended consequences if the approach in the corporate political cases is exported to 
the commercial speech context because of the likely higher standard of review and different 
analytical foundation reflected in the former). 
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distinction of expression premised on the commercial nature of the speaker 
deserves strict scrutiny.”100  
 Thus, the “book’s principal policy recommendation [was] a conservative 
one: do not extend strict scrutiny review to the commercial speech 
doctrine.”101  In writing the book I wanted to urge courts to consider the 
potential ramifications of robust First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech
102
 because strict scrutiny review has troubling implications for the 
government’s ability to regulate commerce.  Yet Redish and Siegal have 
almost nothing to say about this observation except to offer the non sequitur 
that the “commercial speech doctrine is a work in progress.”103 
III. Neuborne: The Romantic First Amendment 
 Neuborne, in contrast to Redish and Siegal, better addresses the 
arguments I actually make in my book rather than a caricature of them—
while also being a more sympathetic interlocutor.  But like Redish and 
Siegal, his view of the First Amendment seems to be  that if one supports 
some regulation of speech, one must not be committed to freedom of speech 
generally.  This is not correct. 
 Neuborne’s review begins with a somewhat romantic narrative about the 
emergence of the iconic First Amendment decisions followed by a story of 
decay and disarray that I am not sure I agree with.
104
  On the whole, however, 
there is much we agree on.  The disagreements we have center on his 
misunderstanding of my argument about what we should make of the 
evidence of manipulation of consumers by advertisers. I argue that there is an 
imbalance of power that justifies regulation, that the evidence of 
manipulation demonstrates that commercial entities are using superior 
resources to undermine consumer autonomy. Neuborne believes that my 
support for regulation means that I don’t take consumers seriously, that I 
would support paternalistic interventions. Neuborne also seems to reject my 
claim that the application of the viewpoint-discrimination/strict-scrutiny 
standard to commercial speech runs the risk of insulating false speech.  I 
discuss this issue first and then address his broader concern that I do not take 
listeners’ interests seriously. 
 
100. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462. 
101. PIETY, supra note 4, at 12. 
102. On the one hand, the trend I identified has become further entrenched with Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) and Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  On the 
other, the unpopularity of at least the Citizens United decision has opened up some political space 
for discussion of this issue.  It has turned what previously may have been a minority viewpoint 
among First Amendment scholars into one that, at least in its broadest outlines, is more mainstream.  
See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153 
(2012). 
103. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462. 
104.  Professor Neuborne’s story of this transformation begins with “Once upon a time” and 
takes up the first 8 or 9 pages of his review. Id. at 1425–33.  




A. Blurring the Commercial/Corporate Speech Distinction 
 As a general matter, Neuborne’s review is a lament that Brandishing the 
First Amendment is not the book he thinks I ought to have written, one which 
would focus more on the dignitary speaker.  He notes that protection for 
commercial and corporate speech is founded on its benefit to listeners, not to 
any dignitary rights of the commercial or corporate speaker
105
 and therefore 
the Citizens United case represents a troubling development. I agree.  The 
critical mistake I believe Neuborne makes is when he says protection for 
commercial and corporate speech is founded on “the dignitary and 
instrumental rights of hearers to receive uncensored information.”106  This is 
not correct.  The commercial speech doctrine was predicated on the right of 
consumers to receive truthful information, not “uncensored” information. 
This distinction is very important. 
 The Virginia Pharmacy Court contemplated that its ruling would permit 
quite a bit of censorship, if by “censorship” one means the government 
suppressing false or misleading speech, requiring warnings or disclaimers, or 
setting the terms and conditions for communications about certain types of 
transactions, as with, for example, securities regulation.
107
  But the courts 
have not traditionally viewed such regulation as censorship.  Only recently 
have advocates like Redish argued that ordinary commercial regulation of 
commercial speech is a form of censorship. 
 The Central Hudson
108
 test provides that in order for commercial speech 
to receive First Amendment protection, the speech must be about a lawful 
product and must not be misleading.
109
  These limitations illustrate why the 
importation to commercial speech of the viewpoint discrimination analysis 
and strict scrutiny is so troubling.  The viewpoint discrimination advocates 
seem to want to elide these limitations on the protection for commercial 
speech and suggest that all commercial speech is protected, including false 
and misleading speech. But the doctrine explicitly excluded false and 
misleading commercial speech, while traditional First Amendment doctrine 
 
105. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1439. 
106. Id. (emphasis added). 
107. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) 
(“Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only 
deceptive or misleading.  We foresee no obstacle to a State’s dealing effectively with this 
problem.”). 
108. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv, Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
109. Id. at 566. 
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protects a great deal of false speech, sometimes explicitly
110
 and sometimes 
as a function of the strict scrutiny standard of review.
111
 
 This is not an appropriate standard to apply to commercial regulation.  A 
commercial entity will only have an interest in conveying truthful 
information to consumers about its product if that truthful information will 
help it sell the product.  If it does not help to sell the product or, worse still, 
depresses sales, the company will not only have no incentive to tell the truth, 




 Neuborne doesn’t believe that regulation of false and misleading speech 
is in any jeopardy because, he says, there is no dignitary speaker in the 
commercial speech doctrine.
113
  While I agree there is no dignitary speaker in 
the commercial speech doctrine, I am not so sanguine.  While Professor 
Neuborne may think “it would take an earthquake to move a majority of the 
Court to recognize that false and misleading commercial speech is entitled to 
full First Amendment protection”114 because “the Court would need an 
entirely new rationale for such an expansion,”115 I argue116 that the Court has 
in fact essentially already dispensed with the underlying rationale for 
protecting commercial speech.  It has already begun to treat commercial 
speech as if it had a dignitary speaker.
117
 
 If I am correct, then it is not at all clear why, as Professor Neuborne 
would have it,
118
 the recent decision in United States v. Alvarez
119
 which 
protected false speech about military honors, has no bearing on commercial 
speech.
120
  In fact, the Court has not used the dignitary speaker as a rationale 
 
110. Recently, the Court struck down a statute which criminalized false claims of military 
honors. Alvarez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). In so doing, the Court repudiated as mere 
dicta the oft-stated observation that there is no First Amendment value in false speech as such. Id. at 
2545 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government advances: that false 
statements receive no First Amendment protection.”).  
111. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (First Amendment requires 
“breathing room” which includes protection for some falsity).  
112. The national experience with tobacco being the most notorious example, illustrates the 
truth of this observation. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, 
and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1222–23 (1988) (stating that the tobacco 
industry is “understandably motivated by enormous profits rather than by concern for truth or the 
public welfare”). 
113. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. See Piety, supra note 4. 
117. On this point Redish and Siegal agree with me.  They write that the commercial speech 
doctrine appears to be subject to strict scrutiny review even if the Court hasn’t yet “explicitly taken 
[that] step.”  Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1462. 
118. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442. 
119. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
120. In fact, a plaintiff in a commercial speech case has already cited Alvarez. See Petition for 
Review, Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State, 2014 WL 1053298, at *15 (Cal. 2014) 
(appealing from Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647 (2014) The 
Court’s recent decision in the POM Wonderful case, although it did not involve a First Amendment 




in either the commercial or corporate speech decisions, relying instead on the 
interests of listeners argument.  If the absence of a dignitary speaker is 
dispositive it should call into question the soundness of the decision to 
extend constitutional protection to corporate political speech as well since, as 
Neuborne observes, there is no dignitary speaker there either.
121
 But as we 
know, it has not. 
 Yet the absence of a dignitary speaker in both doctrines go to the heart 
of what is going on in commercial speech doctrine today.  Resort to content 
neutrality and listeners’ interests allow advocates to avoid acknowledging the 
absence of a dignitary speaker and the meagerness of the corporation’s 
dignitary interests (or lack thereof) in both the commercial and the corporate 
context.  It is a doctrinal sleight of hand which permits advocates of freedom 
for both commercial and corporate speech to level charges of paternalism at 
the advocates of regulation.  It is only through construing commercial and 
corporate speech as a benefit to hearers that the paternalism claim, which is 
Professor Neuborne’s main concern, seems to have plausible analytical 
coherence.  Once we focus on the speaker’s interest we see that regulation of 
commercial speech primarily imposes a restriction on speakers, not listeners.  
And it restrains speakers, not for their own benefit (which would be 
paternalistic), but for the listeners’ benefit (which is not).  The restraint of 
one person for the benefit of another person may or may not be justified, but 
it is not “paternalistic”—at least not in the strictest sense.122  Yet it is an 
objection to what he sees as paternalism that is at the heart of Neuborne’s 
critique. 
B.  Taking Hearers Seriously 
 As the title of his review suggests, Neuborne’s main objection to my 
book is that, in his view, I don’t take hearers seriously.  He claims I 
“infantilize”123 listeners, that I am “condescending.”124  I disagree.  He 
mistakes my recognition of structural imbalances of power and time for 
condescension. I will not fully elaborate the argument that I make in my next 
article, Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial Speech,
125
 but I want 
to sketch out its basic parameters as a response to his book review.   
 
challenge, suggests the Court may be willing to reaffirm its commitment to regulation of 
commercial speech. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 81 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. June 12, 
2014). 
121. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1442. This is the subject of the dispute between himself and 
Redish. 
122. I am aware there are arguments that restricting one person’s liberty to benefit another 
rather than the one so restricted is paternalistic, even though not classically so. I discuss this issue at 
greater length in the paper. Piety, supra note 7.  But the classic construction paternalism is the 
restriction of someone’s liberty for his own good. 
123. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1439. 
124. Id. at 1438. 
125. Piety, supra note 4. 
202 Texas Law Review See Also          [Vol. 92:181 
 
 
 Characterizing consumers as condescended to if we recognize the 
enormous structural (not intellectual) disadvantages they face when coping 
with persuasion attempts by large, powerful companies is an argument 
reminiscent of that advanced by Justice Peckham in Lochner.  In reviewing 
New York’s limitation on the hours worked by bakers, Peckham wrote: 
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in 
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual 
occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for 
themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with 
their independence of judgment and of action.
126
 
This characterization erases the differences in power between employer and 
employee.  Neuborne likewise ignores the difference in power between 
advertiser and consumer. He mistakes my critique of the advertisers’ 
exploitation for one about consumers’ intellectual capacities. Like Redish 
and Siegal, Neuborne assumes that my use of the behavioral science and 
marketing literature demonstrates that I believe consumers have no agency, 
that they are no more than unwitting dupes,  thus justifying “paternalistic”127 
interventions.  This critique is frustrating given that I went to some lengths in 
the book to explain why I thought a great deal of regulation of commercial 
speech is not paternalistic at all. 
 In Chapter 6 of Brandishing the First Amendment I argue that much 
regulation of commercial speech, such as ad blocking or the Do-Not-Call 
Registry, is intended to give consumers more control over the sales pitches 
they receive or more control over their data or their privacy.
128
  Such 
regulation is intended to expand consumers’ autonomy.  Popular demand is 
often the genesis for such regulation.  It is not paternalistic to give citizens 
the legislative relief they want.  To the contrary, it is paternalistic to 
disregard these preferences on the grounds that commercial speech offers 
consumers some benefit that they do not fully appreciate,
129
 such as an 
opportunity to learn self-discipline.
130
 
 It is the proposition that consumers cannot freely choose to cut off their 
exposure to commercial messages because such exposure offers consumers 
valuable learning opportunities that is paternalistic.  This amounts to a 
refusal to give consumers control over the degree to which they must be 
subject to unwanted persuasion attempts, not for ideas, but for commercial 
 
126. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (emphasis added). 
127. Redish & Siegal, supra note 2, at 1471 (writing that I appear to embrace “governmental 
paternalism”). 
128. PIETY, supra note 4, at 107–20. 
129. See generally Goldman, supra note 80. 
130. See, e.g., MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPULATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND LIBERTARIAN 
PATERNALISM 125 (2013) (arguing that regulation may prevent consumers from having educational 
experiences); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral 
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1630–31 (2006) (arguing that regulation may 
prevent consumers from learning self-control). I call this “tough love” paternalism. 




products and services, on the grounds that consumers are bad judges of what 
is good for them.  That sounds fairly paternalistic.  And it forces consumers 
to serve as a resource for advertisers. (They call it data “mining” for a 
reason.) 
It is precisely because I credit listeners with the autonomy to make these 
decisions that I argue that listener autonomy ought to extend to the ability to 
cut off commercial appeals altogether or to otherwise control them in some 
way.  In the political and social realm there is some force to the notion that 
we ought not to be able to shield ourselves completely from opposing points 
of view, if only so we can be forced to think more deeply about our own 
position.  The idea is that it is good for us to be exposed to the ideas we 
hate.
131
  Moreover, speaking has expressive value for the human being who 
wishes to speak and who would be silenced that justifies protection, quite 
apart from whether it has any value to any listener, anywhere. 
 There is no such countervailing social good that comes from forcing 
people to hear commercial pitches they do not want to hear.  It strains 
credulity to suggest we must be exposed to commercial messages for 
products we don’t want to advance the common good.  Indeed, there is a 
compelling case to be made that there are very many harms that can emerge 
from it.  I talk about some of them in the book—rising childhood obesity, 




 Professor Neuborne is concerned that all of the psychological tricks and 
fallibilities of mass communication are present with political speech as well 
as commercial and, thus, it is unclear why we should not likewise intervene 
to test political speech for its truth.
133
  However, because political speech is 
inevitably tied up with party politics, it is reasonable to conclude we could 
never trust a Federal Political Truth Commission to police the truth of 
political speech the way we may (hope) for an agency like the Federal Trade 
Commission to police the truth of private companies’ promotional sales 
claims.
134
 Truth tests in political speech would invade matters less capable of 
factual resolution than those in commercial speech. And political issues  
involve both substantial moral values and the democratic process.  Truth-in-
labeling seems to implicate less transcendent concerns.   
 
131. See generally LEWIS, supra note 8. 
132. There are others I don’t talk about in the book but which I have addressed elsewhere, like 
harms to women in reinforcing anxiety about appearance or gender stereotypes.  See, e.g., Tamara 
R. Piety, Onslaught: Commercial Speech and Gender Inequality, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 47 
(2009). 
133. Neuborne, supra note 3, at 1438. But see  Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, ___U.S. 
___,  No 13-193, slip op. (June 16, 2014) (plaintiff may go forward with challenge to Ohio law  
prohibiting false statements in “attack ads” shortly before an election). 
134. For an argument that would seem to support this view, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s 
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 
(1993). 
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 Moreover, Congress’s power to regulate commerce seems to compel the 
conclusion that commerce, if not totally separate from politics, must be 
analytically distinct in a way that makes regulating it possible and not just 
politics by other means. In any event, the separation between economic 
activity and political activity, while somewhat artificial once money is 
deemed speech, is a divide that has been taken for granted for almost 200 
years in our constitutional jurisprudence
135
  So it is hard to argue that it is 
impossible to police. 
 Also, as  to political speech, there is an argument that the First 
Amendment is needed primarily to protect the dissident and the powerless
136
 
and to allow people to make up their own minds.
137
  However, major 
business corporations are not powerless dissidents.  Indeed,  it is not an 
uncontroversial proposition that they are even legitimate players in the 
democratic process.  Many argue they have far too much influence in public 
affairs relative to the representativeness of their views.  As Justice Marshall 
noted in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,
138
 “[t]he resources 
in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”139  Finally, simply saying a 
corporation’s speech is not entitled to constitutional protection is not the 
same thing as prohibiting it altogether. It may still be protected by statute 
where appropriate.  What is at issue here is whether the people may use the 
political process to restrain private power.  
Professor Neuborne accuses me of not taking listeners seriously, of 
endorsing excessive paternalism.  Yet he appears to embrace the notion that 
everything the corporate speaker wishes to say in aid of selling its product is 
something that the listeners are necessarily interested in (or ought to be 
interested in) hearing, whether they know it or not and on this basis it must 
be protected from their illiberal impulses  It is this argument that I propose is 
both deeply paternalistic and undemocratic.  It deprives the people of the 
opportunity to use the political process to restrain private power. 
 To deny them this power turns them into a resource for marketers, one 
that can be mined just like coal or oil and that gives consumers little 
autonomy over their own lives.  I discuss this argument in more detail in 
Paternalism and the Regulation of Commercial Speech.  I do not anticipate it 
will meet with Professor Redish’s approval, but I cherish the hope that it 
might as yet be more persuasive for Professor Neuborne. 
 
135. PIETY, supra note 4, at 1, 78–79. 
136. Emerson actually discusses these ideas throughout, but a few examples can be found in 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory, supra note 64, at 885, 890–98, 951. 
137. Again, this element is discussed extensively throughout.  See id. at 881–82. 
138. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
139. Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986)). 
